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ABSTRACT
Deep Convolutional Networks (DCNs) have been shown to be vul-
nerable to adversarial examples—perturbed inputs specically de-
signed to produce intentional errors in the learning algorithms at
test time. Existing input-agnostic adversarial perturbations exhibit
interesting visual paerns that are currently unexplained. In this
paper, we introduce a structured approach for generating Universal
Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) with procedural noise functions.
Our approach unveils the systemic vulnerability of popular DCN
models like Inception v3 and YOLO v3, with single noise paerns
able to fool a model on up to 90% of the dataset. Procedural noise
allows us to generate a distribution of UAPs with high universal eva-
sion rates using only a few parameters. Additionally, we propose
Bayesian optimization to eciently learn procedural noise param-
eters to construct inexpensive untargeted black-box aacks. We
demonstrate that it can achieve an average of less than 10 queries
per successful aack, a 100-fold improvement on existing methods.
We further motivate the use of input-agnostic defences to increase
the stability of models to adversarial perturbations. e universality
of our aacks suggests that DCN models may be sensitive to ag-
gregations of low-level class-agnostic features. ese ndings give
insight on the nature of some universal adversarial perturbations
and how they could be generated in other applications.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computing methodologies→ Machine learning; •Security
and privacy→ Usability in security and privacy;
KEYWORDS
Adversarial examples; Bayesian optimization; black-box aacks;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Advances in computation and machine learning have enabled deep
learning methods to become the favoured algorithms for various
tasks such as computer vision [31], malware detection [64], and
speech recognition [22]. Deep Convolutional Networks (DCN)
achieve human-like or beer performance in some of these appli-
cations. Given their increased use in safety-critical and security
applications such as autonomous vehicles [4, 74, 76], intrusion
detection [28, 29], malicious string detection [65], and facial recog-
nition [39, 70], it is important to ensure that such algorithms are
robust to malicious adversaries. Yet despite the prevalence of neural
networks, their vulnerabilities are not yet fully understood.
It has been shown that machine learning systems are vulnerable
to aacks performed at test time [2, 23, 41, 47, 53]. In particular,
DCNs have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial examples:
inputs indistinguishable from genuine data points but designed to
be misclassied by the learning algorithm [73]. As the perturbation
required to fool the learning algorithm is usually small, detecting
adversarial examples is a challenging task. Fig. 1 shows an ad-
versarial example generated with the aack strategy we propose
in this paper; the perturbed image of a tabby cat is misclassied
as a shower curtain. Although we focus on computer vision, this
phenomenon has been shown in other application domains such
as speech processing [9, 11], malware classication [19], and rein-
forcement learning [24, 37] among others.
Figure 1: Adversarial example generated with a procedural
noise function. From le to right: original image, adversar-
ial example, and procedural noise (magnied for visibility).
Below are the classier’s top 5 output probabilities.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach for generating adver-
sarial examples based on the use of procedural noise functions. Such
functions are commonly used in computer graphics and designed
to be parametrizable, fast, and lightweight [34]. eir primary pur-
pose is to algorithmically generate textures and paerns on the y.
Procedurally generated noise paerns have interesting structures
that are visually similar to those in existing universal adversarial
perturbations [30, 44].
We empirically demonstrate that DCNs are fragile to procedural
noise and these act as Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs),
i.e. input-agnostic adversarial perturbations. Our experimental
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results on the large-scale ImageNet classiers show that our pro-
posed black-box aacks can fool classiers on up to 98.3% of input
examples. e aack also transfers to the object detection task,
showing that it has an obfuscating eect on objects against the
YOLO v3 object detector [60]. ese results suggest that large-
scale indiscriminate black-box aacks against DCN-based machine
learning services are not only possible but can be realized at low
computational costs. Our contributions are as follows:
• We show a novel and intuitive vulnerability of DCNs in
computer vision tasks to procedural noise perturbations.
ese functions characterize a distribution of noise pat-
terns with high universal evasion, and universal pertur-
bations optimized on small datasets generalize to datasets
that are 10 to 100 times larger. To our knowledge, this is
the rst model-agnostic black-box generation of universal
adversarial perturbations.
• We propose Bayesian optimization [43, 68] as an eective
tool to augment black-box aacks. In particular, we show
that it can use our procedural noise to cra inexpensive
universal and input-specic black-box aacks. It improves
on the query eciency of random parameter selection by
5-fold and consistently outperforms the popular L-BFGS
optimization algorithm. Against existing query-ecient
black-box aacks, we achieve a 100 times improvement
on the query eciency while maintaining a competitive
success rate.
• We show evidence that our procedural noise UAPs appear
to exploit low-level features in DCNs, and that this vul-
nerability may be exploited to create universal adversarial
perturbations across applications. We also highlight the
shortcomings of adversarial training and suggest using
more input-agnostic defences to reduce model sensitivity
to adversarial perturbations.
e rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we
dene a taxonomy to evaluate evasion aacks. In Sect. 3, we de-
scribe and motivate the use of procedural noise functions. In Sect. 4,
we demonstrate how dierent DCN architectures used in image
classication have vulnerabilities to procedural noise. In Sect. 5, we
show how to leverage this vulnerability to create ecient black-box
aacks. In Sect. 6, we analyze how the aack transfers to the object
detection task and discuss how it can generalize to other applica-
tion domains. In Sect. 7, we explore denoising as a preliminary
countermeasure. Finally, in Sect. 8, we summarize our ndings and
suggest future research directions.
2 ATTACK TAXONOMY
Our study focuses on aacks at test time, also known as evasion
aacks. To determine the viability and impact of aacks in practical
seings, we categorize them according to three factors: (a) the
generalizability of their perturbations, (b) the access and knowledge
the adversary requires, and (c) the desired output. ese factors
also describe the threat model being considered.
2.1 Generalizability
e generalizability of adversarial perturbations refers to their abil-
ity to apply across a dataset or to other models. Perturbations that
generalize are more ecient because they do not need to be re-
computed for new data points or models. eir generalizability can
be described by their transferability and universality.
Input-specic adversarial perturbations are designed for a spe-
cic input against a given model, these are neither transferable
or universal. Transferable adversarial perturbations can fool mul-
tiple models [51] when applied to the same input. is property
enhances the strength of the aack, as the same adversarial input
can degrade the performance of multiple models, and makes pos-
sible black-box aacks through surrogate models. Perturbations
are universal when the same adversarial perturbation can be ap-
plied successfully across a large portion of the input dataset to
fool a classier [44]. Cross-model universal perturbations are both
transferable and universal, i.e., they generalize across both a large
portion of the inputs and across models. Generating adversarial
perturbations that generalize is suitable and more ecient in at-
tacks that target a large number of data points and models, i.e. for
broad spectrum indiscriminate aacks. In contrast, input-specic
aacks may be easier to cra when a few specic data points or
models are targeted or for targeted aacks where the aacker aims
to produce some specic types of errors.
2.2 Degree of Knowledge
For evasion aacks, we assume that the aacker has access to the
test input and output. Beyond this, the adversary’s knowledge
and capabilities range from no access or knowledge of the targeted
system to complete control of the target model. Accordingly, aacks
can be broadly classied as: white-box, grey-box, or black-box [53].
In white-box seings, the adversary has complete knowledge of
the model architecture, parameters, and training data. is is the
seing adopted by many existing studies including [10, 18, 32, 40,
45, 73]. In grey-box seings, the adversary can build a surrogate
model of similar scale and has access to training data similar to that
used to train the target system. is seing is adopted in transfer
aacks where white-box adversarial examples are generated on a
surrogate model to aack the targeted model [33, 52]. is approach
can also be adapted for a black-box seing. For example Papernot
et al. [52] apply a heuristic to generate synthetic data based on
queries to the target classier, thus removing the requirement for
labelled training data. In a black-box seing, the adversary has no
knowledge of the target model and no access to surrogate datasets.
e only interaction with the target model is by querying it, this is
oen referred to as an “oracle”.
Given the adversary’s lack of knowledge, black-box aacks rely
heavily on making numerous queries to gain information. is
increases the chances of the aack being detected. us, the most
dangerous aacks are those that require the least queries and re-
sources. With fewer queries, adversarial perturbations are gener-
ated sooner, costs (when using a paid service) are lower and the
volume of suspicious queries is reduced. Existing black box aacks
like [3, 12] have shown some success with zeroth order optimization
and gradient estimation. However they require tens to hundreds of
thousands of queries on datasets with a large number of features,
as in realistic natural-image dataset like ImageNet [13, 25]. e
most query-ecient method reported so far is a bandit optimization
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framework that achieves 92.9% success with an average of 1, 000
queries per image on ImageNet [25].
2.3 Desired Output
e adversary’s goal varies according to the application and the ex-
pected rewards gained from exploiting the system. Usually, aacks
are considered as either targeted or untargeted (indiscriminate).
In targeted aacks the adversary aims for a specic subset of
inputs to be misclassied as their chosen output. In untargeted
aacks, the aacker aims to cause classication errors on a subset
of inputs. Both these aacks disrupt the machine learning system
by forcing errors and undermining the model’s reliability.
In multi-class classication, targeted aacks are more challeng-
ing due to their specicity, but successful ones allow a greater
degree of manipulation for the aacker. On the other side, untar-
geted aacks are typically easier, as they just have to evade the
“correct” classication, and this characteristic is more suited for
broad indiscriminate aacks.
3 PROCEDURAL NOISE
We introduce procedural noise functions as an intuitive and com-
putationally ecient approach to generate adversarial examples
in black-box seings. Procedural noise functions are algorithmic
techniques used for generating image paerns, typically used in the
creation of natural details to enhance images in video and graph-
ics production. ey are designed to be fast to evaluate, scale to
large dimensions, and have low memory footprint. ese aributes
make them desirable for generating computationally inexpensive
perturbations. For a more comprehensive survey on procedural
noise, we refer the reader to Lagae et al. [34].
3.1 Motivation
Existing Universal Adversarial Perturbations (UAPs) generated by
white-box aacks exhibit interesting visual structures that are [44],
as of yet, not fully understood. UAPs are particularly interesting
as their universality reveals more generic or class-agnostic fea-
tures that machine learning algorithms appear to be sensitive to.
In contrast, input-specic adversarial perturbations, though less
detectable in many cases, can “overt” and apply only to the inputs
they were designed for [79].
Current approaches, like the following, cra UAPs using white-
box knowledge of the model’s learned parameters. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [44] use the DeepFool algorithm [45] iteratively over a set of
images. Mopuri et al. [46] use Generative Adversarial Nets (GANs)
to compute UAPs, whilst Khrulkov and Oseledets [30] propose to
use the singular vector method that maximizes the dierence in
activations at a targeted hidden layer between the original and the
adversarial examples.
We hypothesize that procedural noise, which exhibits paerns
visually similar to those of UAPs (see Appendix A), can also act as
a UAP. Procedural noise is simple to implement, fast to compute,
and does not require the additional overhead of building, training,
or accessing a DCN to generate adversarial perturbations. e
parametrization of procedural noise is simpler and this results in
a reduced search space, which can enable query-ecient black-
box aacks. is is particularly useful in large-scale applications
like natural-image classication where existing aacks explore the
entire input space, which has very high dimensionality (≥ 100,000).
Procedural noise functions can be classied into three categories:
laice gradient noise, sparse convolution noise, and explicit noise
[34]. Laice gradient noise is generated by interpolating random
values or gradients at the points of an integer laice, with Perlin
noise as a representative example. Sparse convolution noise is a
sum of randomly positioned and weighted kernels,1 with Gabor
noise as a representative example. Explicit noise diers from the
others in that the images are generated in advance and stored
later for retrieval. is induces large memory costs and limits its
applicability as an inexpensive aack. We therefore do not use it
here and leave its investigation for future work.
3.2 Perlin Noise
We chose to use Perlin noise as a representative example for laice
gradient noise, because of its ease of use, popularity, and simplic-
ity. Perlin noise was developed as a technique to produce natural-
looking textures for computer graphics, with its initial application
in motion pictures where it has remained a staple of the industry
[34]. Although Perlin noise may not be the most expressive noise
function, it has a simple implementation which makes it suitable
for inexpensive black-box aacks as it is controlled by only a few
parameters.
We summarize the formal construction of two-dimensional Per-
lin nose as described by Perlin [54–56]. e value at a point (x ,y)
is derived as follows: let (i, j) dene the four laice points of the
laice square where i = {|x |, |x | + 1} and j = {|y |, |y | + 1}. e four
gradients are given by qi j = V[Q[Q[i] + j]] where precomputed
arrays Q and V contain a pseudo-random permutation and pseudo-
random unit gradient vectors respectively. e four linear functions
qi j (x − i,y − j) are then bilinearly interpolated by s(x − |x |) and
s(y − |y |), where s(t) = 6t5 − 15t4 + 10t3. e result is the Perlin
noise value p(x ,y) for coordinates (x ,y).
e Perlin noise function has several parameters that determine
the visual appearance of the noise. In our implementation, the
wavelengths λx , λy and number of octaves Ω contribute the most
to the visual change. e noise value at point (x ,y)with parameters
δper = {λx , λy ,Ω} becomes
Sper(x ,y) =
Ω∑
n=1
p(x · 2n−1λx ,y ·
2n−1
λy
)
To achieve more distinct visual paerns, we use a sine colour
map with an additional frequency parameter ϕsine. is colour map
for the noise value p is dened by C(p) = sin(p · 2piϕsine). e
periodicity of the sine function creates distinct bands in the image
to achieve a high frequency of edges. e resulting noise generating
function Gper at point (x ,y) is dened as the composition of our
Perlin noise function and the sine colour map,
Gper(x ,y) = C(Sper(x ,y)) = sin((Sper(x ,y) · 2piϕsine)
with combined parameters δper = {λx , λy ,ϕsine,Ω}.
1A kernel in image processing refers to a matrix used for image convolution.
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3.3 Gabor Noise
We use Gabor noise as a representative example for sparse con-
volution noise. It has more accurate spectral control than other
procedural noise functions [35], where spectral control refers to
the ability to control the appearance of noise as measured by its
energy along each frequency band. Gabor noise can be quickly
evaluated at any point in space and is characterized by only a few
parameters such as orientation, frequency, and bandwidth [35]. In
essence, Gabor noise is a convolution between sparse white noise
and a Gabor kernel д. e Gabor kernel is the product of a circular
Gaussian and a Harmonic function:
д(x ,y) = e−piσ 2(x 2+y2) cos [ 2piλ (x cosω + y sinω)],
where σ is the width of the Gaussian, λ and ω are the period and
orientation of the Harmonic function [34]. Our implementation of
the Gabor kernel uses the OpenCV library [5]. e value Sgab(x ,y)
at point (x ,y) is the sparse convolution with a Gabor kernel where
{(xi ,yi )} are the random points [34]. Gabor noise is an expressive
noise function and will have a large number of dimensions if each
random point is assigned dierent kernel parameters. To simplify
the implementation, we use the same parameters and weights for
each random point (xi ,yi ). is results in noise paerns that have
a uniform texture.
We add an additional discrete parameter ξ to control the isotropy
of the Gabor noise. Having ξ = 1 results in anisotropic noise, which
is oriented in one direction. Progressively larger ξ makes it more
uniform in all directions. Implementing these changes gives an
updated formulation
Sgab(x ,y) = 1ξ
ξ∑
n=1
∑
i
д(x − xi ,y − yi ;σ , λ,ω + npiξ ).
To achieve high-frequency paerns and remove unwanted low-
contrast oscillations, we normalize the variance spectrum of the
Gabor noise using the algorithm described by Neyret and Heitz [48].
is results in min-max oscillations. Note that we refer specically
to the frequency of edges, i.e. how oen edges appear one aer the
other on an image. is is dierent from the classical frequency
used in spectral analysis. For simplicity we use “low-frequency” or
“high-frequency” when referring to paerns with low or high edge
frequency in the image.
We have tried applying the sine colour map to Gabor noise,
but it obscures the Gabor kernel structures. Similarly, we have
tried normalizing the variance spectrum of Perlin noise, but this
resulted in at images with few edges and no distinct paerns. e
nal noise generating function Gper with a normalized variance
spectrum has parameters δgab = {σ , λ,ω, ξ }.
4 VULNERABILITY TO PROCEDURAL NOISE
In this section, we empirically demonstrate the vulnerability of ve
dierent DCN architectures to procedural noise for the ImageNet
classication task. We show that randomly chosen procedural noise
perturbations act as eective UAPs against these classiers. e
procedural noise UAPs greatly exceed the baseline uniform random
noise, is on average universal on more than half the dataset across
dierent models, and fools each model on more than 72% of the
dataset when considering input-specic evasion.
4.1 Experiment Setup
e data used are 5,000 random images from the validation set of
the ILSVRC2012 ImageNet classication task [63]. It is a widely
used object recognition benchmark with images taken from vari-
ous search engines and manually labelled to 1,000 distinct object
categories where each image is assigned one ground truth label.
Models. We use four distinct DCN architectures pre-trained
on ImageNet: VGG-19 [67], ResNet-50 [21], Inception v3 [72], and
Inception ResNet v2 [71]. We abbreviate Inception ResNet v2 to
IRv2. Inception v3 and Inception ResNet v2 take input images with
dimensions 299 × 299 × 3 while the remaining two networks take
images with dimensions 224 × 224 × 3.
We also take an ensemble adversarially trained version of the
Inception ResNet v2 architecture: Tramer et al. [75] ne-tuned the
IRv2 network by applying ensemble adversarial training, making it
more robust to gradient-based aacks. We refer to this new model
as IRv2ens. It has the same architecture, but dierent weights when
compared to the rst IRv2. For complete details of the ensemble
adversarial training process, we refer the reader to [75].
Perturbations. e Perlin noise parameters λx , λy ,ϕsine and
Gabor noise parameters σ , λ are positive and bounded above by
the image’s side length d . Increasing the parameters beyond this
will have no impact on the resulting image as it gets clipped by the
image dimension. e isotropy ξ ∈ [1, 12] and number of octaves
Ω ∈ [1, 4] are discrete, and evaluations show negligible change in
the image for ξ > 12 and Ω > 4. e range on the angle ω ∈ [0, 2pi ]
covers all directions.
We x the kernel size and number of random points for Gabor
noise so that the Gabor kernels always populate the entire image.
e parameters δgab of the Gabor noise have the greater inuence
on the resulting visual appearance of the noise paern.
To provide a baseline, we also test the models against uniform
random noise perturbations: sgn(r ) · ε where r ∈ U(−1, 1)d×d×3, d
is the image’s side length, and ε is the `∞-norm constraint on the
perturbation. is is an `∞-optimized uniform random noise, and it
is reasonable to say that aacks that signicantly outperform this
baseline are non-trivial.
Metrics. To measure the universality of a perturbation, we
dene the universal evasion rate of a perturbation over the dataset.
Given model output f , input x ∈ X , perturbation s , and small ε > 0,
the universal evasion of s over X is
|{x ∈ X : arg max f (x + s) , τ (x)}|
|X | , ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε,
where τ (x) is the true class label of x . An `∞-norm constraint on
s ensures that the perturbation is small and does not drastically
alter the visual appearance of the resulting image; this is a proxy
for the constraint τ (x) = τ (x + s). We choose the `∞-norm as it
is straightforward to impose for procedural noise perturbations
and is oen used in the adversarial machine learning literature.
In this case, f is the probability output vector, but note that the
aacker only needs to know the output class label arg max f (x + s)
to determine if their aacks succeed. To measure the model’s
sensitivity against the perturbations for each input, we dene the
model’s average sensitivity on an input x over perturbations s ∈ S
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as
|{s ∈ S : arg max f (x + s) , τ (x)}|
|S | , ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε .
is will help determine the portion of the dataset on which the
model is more vulnerable. Finally, the input-specic evasion rate is
|{x ∈ X : ∃s ∈ S such that arg max f (x + s) , τ (x)}|
|X | , ‖s‖∞ ≤ ε .
is measures how many inputs in the dataset can be evaded with
perturbations from S .
Experiment. We evaluate our procedural noise perturbations
on 5,000 random images from the validation set. e perturbations
generated are from 1,000 Gabor noise, 1,000 Perlin noise, and 10,000
uniform random perturbations. 1,000 queries for the procedural
noise functions was sucient for our results and its search space
only has four bounded parameters. We use an `∞-norm constraint
of ε = 16. e pixels of the perturbations are rst clipped to [−ε, ε]
and the resulting adversarial example’s pixels are clipped to the
image space [0, 255].
us, this is an untargeted black-box aack with exactly 1,000
queries per image for procedural noise. Note that the adversary has
no knowledge of the target model and only requires the top label
from the model’s output.
4.2 Universality of Perturbations
e procedural noise perturbations appear to be both universal
and transferable across models. e results in Fig. 2 show that the
models in order from least to most robust against the perturbations
are: VGG-19, ResNet-50, Inception v3, IRv2, and then IRv2ens. is
is not surprising, as the generalization error for these models appear
in the same order, with larger generalization error indicating a less
robust model. e ensemble adversarially trained model has also
been hardened against adversarial examples, so it was expected to
be less aected. However, the ensemble adversarial training did
not fully mitigate the impact of the procedural noise.
Both Gabor and Perlin noise have signicantly higher universal
evasion rate than random noise. In Fig. 2a, we represent random
noise using the median (which, in this case, is very close to the
mean) of its universal evasion rate over all 10,000 perturbations, as
the variance is very small (less than 10−5) for each model.
Procedural noise functions create a distribution whose modes
have high universal evasion rates. Table 1 shows an example of this
on Inception v3, where more than half the Perlin noise perturbations
achieve evasion on more than 57% of the dataset.
Between the two procedural noises, Perlin noise is a stronger
UAP, though not by a large margin. In Fig. 2a, Gabor noise appears
bimodal, especially with the IRv2 classiers. is bimodal aspect
shows that there are two large disjoint subsets of Gabor noise: one
with high universal evasion and another with low universal evasion.
is was not as prominent for Perlin noise.
Best Parameters. Given the distribution of universal evasion
rates in Fig. 2a, it is interesting to observe which parameters of
the noise functions contribute most to the evasion rate. Because
there are only four parameters for each procedural noise function,
the linear correlations between these parameters and the universal
evasion rates give a general overview of their inuence. ough
this analysis may not fully capture multi-variable relationships.
Table 1: Universal evasion (%) by percentile for random and
procedural noise perturbations on Inception v3.
Percentile Random Gabor Perlin
min 26.0 24.7 26.4
25th 26.8 39.9 47.2
50th 27.0 49.1 57.7
75th 27.1 53.3 63.7
max 27.9 61.8 73.2
For Gabor noise, the parameters σ , ω, and ξ have low correlation
(≤ 0.16) with universal evasion. e remaining parameter λ how-
ever has a high correlation (≥ 0.52) with the universal evasion rate
across all classiers; this peaks at 0.90 for IRv2ens. λ corresponds to
the wavelength of the harmonic kernel. Visually, lower values of λ
indicate thinner and more frequent bands, which is why λ can also
be thought of as an inverse frequency. e correlations suggest that
low-frequency Gabor noise paerns correlate with high universal
evasion, and this appears to be more pronounced as we move to
the more robust models.
For Perlin noise, the parameters λx and λy have low correlation
(≤ 0.25) with universal evasion. e universal evasion rates have a
moderate negative correlation with the number of octaves Ω and
have a moderately-high positive correlation with ϕsine for the non-
adversarially trained models. is suggests that high-frequency
Perlin noise paerns correlate with high universal evasion. e
number of octaves indicate the amount of detail or the number
of curvatures within the image, so a slight negative correlation
indicates that some paerns that achieve high evasion have fewer
curvatures and details. Visually, the frequency of the sine function
ϕsine can be thought of as the thinness of the bands in the image.
is is the opposite of the λ in Gabor noise, so we have a similar
result where IRv2ens is more susceptible to low-frequency paerns.
Low-frequency paerns are also more eective on IRv2ens be-
cause this model was adversarially trained on gradient-based at-
tacks, which we hypothesize generated mostly high-frequency per-
turbations. e frequency appears to be an important factor in
determining the strength of the UAP even when Gabor and Per-
lin noise have opposite correlations between their frequency and
their universal evasion. is dierence shows that these noise pat-
terns have notably dierent characteristics. Complete correlation
matrices are available in Appendix C.
Cross-model Universality. e UAPs with high universal eva-
sion on one model oen have high universal evasion on the other
models. For example, a Perlin noise perturbation has 86.7%, 77.4%,
73.2%, 58.2%, and 45.9% universal evasion on VGG-19, ResNet-50,
Inception v3, IRv2, and IRv2ens respectively.
e correlation of the universal evasion rates across models is
high (≥ 0.80), which shows the transferability of our UAPs across
models. For Gabor noise, there is a high correlation across all mod-
els. For Perlin noise, there appears to be a noticeable dierence
between IRv2ens and the remaining four models. e strongest Per-
lin noise on the undefended models have high-frequency paerns
that the adversarial training partially mitigated.
Overall, the results show that procedural noise perturbations act
as UAPs across all models. is is the rst black-box generation of
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(a) Universal Evasion Rate
(b) Average Sensitivity
Figure 2: Histogram of (a) universal evasion rate over all perturbations and (b) average sensitivity over all inputs across all
models. For example, VGG-19 in (a) shows that about 12% of the Gabor noise perturbations have a universal evasion rate of
approximately 0.8.
cross-model UAPs, and the procedural noise allows us to draw per-
turbations from a distribution with high average universal evasion.
We now look at the results from an input-specic perspective.
4.3 Model Sensitivity on Inputs
e model’s sensitivity could vary across the input dataset, i.e. the
model’s predictions are stable for some inputs while others are
more susceptible to small perturbations. We measure this with the
average sensitivity of single inputs over all perturbations. Results
in Fig. 2b show that the average sensitivity of the dataset is bimodal
for all models and both procedural noise functions. ere are two
distinct subsets of the data: one on the right that is very sensitive
and the other on the le that is very insensitive to the perturbations.
e remaining data points are somewhat uniformly spread in the
middle. e number of points on the le peak of the histogram in
Fig. 2b is larger for the most robust models. Similarly to Fig. 2a,
this progression indicates that the order of most to least sensitive
models align with the most to least robust models. We omit results
for random noise since more than 60% of the input dataset are
barely aected by it across all models. is manifests as a tall peak
on the le and a short peak on the right.
When comparing the average sensitivity of inputs between the
two procedural noise functions on the same models, the correlations
range between 0.89-0.92, which shows that both procedural noise
perturbations aect very similar groups of inputs for each model.
e correlation between the average sensitivities for each input
across the Inception models is at least 0.79, which suggests that
these models are sensitive to procedural noise on similar inputs.
is is less so between ResNet-50 and VGG-19 whose correlations
with the other models range from 0.56-0.81.
Input-specic Evasion. We consider the case when our untar-
geted black-box aack is used as an input-specic aack, i.e. the
adversary only needs to nd at least one adversarial perturbation
that evades each input. us, Evasion on input x is achieved when
∃s ∈ S such that arg max f (x + s) , τ (x). is is in contrast to the
universal aack where the adversary cras a single perturbation to
fool the model on as many inputs as possible.
Note that the random noise is optimized for the `∞-norm. We
draw the random noise perturbation from {−ε, ε}d×d×3. us, for
each pixel the added noise is either −ε or ε , rather than drawing
from the continuous domain (−ε, ε). It is reasonable to think that a
larger perturbation is more likely to cause evasion.
Table 2 shows that VGG-19 and ResNet-50 are particularly fragile
as even random noise greatly degrades their performance. Although
the Inception models are more robust, both procedural noise pertur-
bations still achieve more than 72% evasion on all of them. Although
ensemble adversarial training improved the robustness of IRv2, it
still does not mitigate the impact of the procedural noise aack.
e idea of ensemble adversarial training was to decouple the gen-
eration of the adversarial training set from the original model, but
this was limited since it was only done for gradient-based aacks.
We argue that defences should be more input-agnostic to avoid
having to train against all types of aacks.
Label Analysis. e procedural noise perturbations were not
designed to be a targeted aack, but intuitively, the same universal
perturbation would cause misclassication towards class labels that
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Table 2: Input-specic evasion rate (in %) for random and
procedural noise perturbations. Original refers to the top 1
error on the unaltered original images. Strongest attack on
each classier is highlighted.
Classier Original Random Gabor Perlin
VGG-19 29.4 57.1 97.7 98.3
ResNet-50 25.9 55.7 96.2 96.3
Inception v3 22.3 46.8 89.2 93.6
IRv2 20.1 38.7 81.1 87.0
IRv2ens 20.1 37.5 72.7 79.4
have visually similar textures to the procedural noise paern. We
nd that this holds true for only a few of the procedural noise UAPs.
For a given procedural noise perturbation, we dene its top label
to be the class label it causes the most misclassication towards.
When looking at procedural noise UAPs across all models, about 90%
of Gabor noise perturbations have their top label apply to at most
9% of the inputs. For Perlin noise, about 80% of its perturbations
have their top label on at most 10% of the input. ere are however
a few outliers that have their top label appear above 10% of the
inputs. For example, on Inception v3, the top Gabor noise with
61.8% universal evasion has “window screen” as its top label and it
applies for 37.8% of the evaded inputs. In contrast, another Gabor
noise perturbation with 58.9% universal evasion has “quilt” as its
top label, but it only applies for 6.0% of the evaded inputs. As a
consequence, it is still possible to use procedural noise to create
universal targeted UAPs aimed at specic class labels like “window
screen” or “brain coral”. However the class labels we can target
is dependent on the procedural noise and the overall success of
universal targeted aacks may be limited, as it is more dicult to
make a perturbation both universal and targeted.
Perlin noise has a relatively large amount of “brain coral” clas-
sications, with other labels such as “maze” and “shower curtain”
also appearing frequently in the top ve most classied labels per
classier. For Gabor noise, there was no label that consistently
appeared at the top across all models. ese results indicate that
Perlin noise has a larger bias towards certain classes, while Gabor
noise is more indiscriminate.
4.4 Discussion
Adversarial examples exploit the model’s sensitivity, causing large
changes in the model’s output by applying specic small changes
to the input. More specically, recent work has shown adversarial
examples exploit ”non-robust” features that the model learns but
that are incomprehensible to humans [26]. It is likely that UAPs
may be exploiting ”universal” non-robust features that the DCN
has learned.
Textures. Previous results have shown ImageNet-trained DCNs
to be more reliant on textures rather than shapes [14]. ough
not explicitly shown in the later Inception architectures (Inception
v3, IRv2), these are still likely to have a strong texture-bias due
to similarities in the training. e texture bias however does not
fully explain why small, and sometimes imperceptible, changes
to the texture can drastically alter the classication output. We
aribute adversarial perturbations more to the sensitivity of the
model. Moreover, we test our aack against an object detection
model in Sect. 6, and show that it also degrades the performance of
models that have a spatial component in their learning task.
Generalizability of Procedural Noise. From the label analy-
sis of procedural noise UAPs, we observe that most perturbations
with high universal evasion do not have a strong bias towards
any particular class label—no particular class is targeted more
than 10% for over 80% of the procedural noise UAPs. is suggest
that UAPs leverage more generic low-level features that the model
learns, which would explain their universality and indiscriminate
behaviour in causing misclassication.
Amongst white-box UAP aacks, our procedural noise has the
closest visual appearance to perturbations from the Singular Vector
Aack (SVA) by Khrulkov and Oseledets [30]. ey generate UAPs
targeting specic layers of DCNs, and found that targeting earlier
layers of the network generated more successful UAPs. e paerns
obtained for these earlier layers share a visual appearance with
procedural noise. ese layers also correspond to the low-level
features learned by the network. Other evidence also suggests that
procedural noise exploits low-level features, as feature visualization
of earlier layers in neural networks share the same visual appear-
ance with some procedural noise paerns. Convolutional layers
induce a prior on DCNs to learn local spatial information [17], and
DCNs trained on natural-image datasets learn convolution lters
that are similar in appearance to Gabor kernels and colour blobs
[49, 78]. Gabor noise appears to be a simple collection of low-level
features whereas Perlin noise seems to be a more complex mixture
of low-level features. is dierence in the complexity of their
visual appearance may explain why Perlin noise is a stronger aack
than Gabor noise.
Procedural noise aacks transfer with high correlation across
the models most likely because they share the same training set
(ImageNet), learning algorithms (e.g. backpropagation), and have
similar components in their architectures (e.g. convolutional lay-
ers). is increases the likelihood that they share input-agnostic
vulnerabilities. In this way, our results appear to support the idea
that DCNs are sensitive to aggregations of low-level features.
Security Implications. In transfer learning, a model trained
on one task is re-purposed as an initialization or xed feature
extractor for another similar or related task. When used as a feature
extractor, the initial layers are oen frozen to preserve the low-level
features learned. e subsequent layers, closer to the output, are
then re-trained for the new task [78]. Hidden layers from models
pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset are oen re-used for other
natural-image classication tasks [50]. is makes it a notable
target as vulnerabilities that exploit low-level features encoded in
the earlier layers carry over to the new models.
Transfer learning has many benets as training entire models
from scratch for large-scale tasks like natural-image classication
can be costly both computationally in training and in terms of
gathering the required data. However, this creates a systemic threat,
as subsequent models will also be vulnerable to aacks on low-level
features like procedural noise. Precisely characterizing the extent
of the vulnerability of re-purposed models to the same aack is an
interesting direction for future work.
Procedural noise is an accessible and inexpensive way for gener-
ating UAPs against existing image classiers. In our experiments
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the Gabor and Perlin noise functions modied only four parameters,
and each parameter was bounded in a closed interval. Drawing from
this space of perturbations has generated UAPs with high universal
evasion rates. Aackers can take advantage of the small search
space by using procedural noise to cra query-ecient untargeted
black-box aacks as we will show in Sect. 5.
Strengths & Limitations. Procedural noise is one of the rst
black-box generation of UAPs. Other existing black-box aacks
oen optimize for input-specic evasion, and other existing UAP
generation methods are white-box or grey-box. Whilst procedural
noise is also a generative model, it diers from other generative
models like Bayesian networks, Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs), or Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) as it does not require
the additional overhead of building and training these generative
models–which oen requires more resources and stronger adver-
saries to execute successfully.
Comparing procedural noise aacks with existing black-box at-
tacks is not straightforward, as procedural noise naturally has high
universal evasion rates. is gives procedural noise an advantage
in that, despite having no access to the target model, randomly
drawn procedural noise paerns are likely to have high universal
evasion. e search space for our procedural noise has only four
dimensions, whereas most aacks are designed for the whole input
space of hundreds of thousands of dimensions. However, this does
come at a cost, as procedural noise functions do not capture ad-
versarial perturbations outside their codomain. Other aacks that
explore the whole input space are able to take full advantage of a
stronger adversary (i.e. white-box or grey-box seing) or larger
query limits. We explore this trade-o further with input-specic
black-box aacks in Sect. 5.3.
Another limitation of this experiment was the use of an `∞-norm
constraint. Although it is oen used in the literature as a proxy
for human perception, `p -norms have limitations [16] e.g., low-
frequency paerns appear to be more visible than high-frequency
paerns for the same `p -norm. is frequency could be used as
an additional constraint and developing a more reliable proxy for
human perception remains an interesting avenue for future work.
Summary. Procedural noise aacks specialize as untargeted
black-box perturbations with naturally high universal evasion. Of-
fensively, this has applications as a large-scale indiscriminate aack
and, defensively, as a standard test on machine learning services.
We expand on this perspective in the following sections. In Sect. 5,
we develop query-ecient black-box aacks using procedural noise
and Bayesian optimization. In Sect. 6, we apply our procedural
noise aack against a DCN designed for object detection, showing
that the aack can generalize to other tasks. In Sect. 7, we test an
input-agnostic defence in median lter denoising.
5 EFFICIENT BLACK-BOX ATTACKS
Whilst in previous sections we have shown that procedural noise
functions are an ecient way to generate adversarial perturbations,
another signicant advantage they bring is their low-dimensional
search space. is enables the use of query-ecient black-box
optimization techniques that otherwise do not scale well to high-
dimensional problems. In this section, we compare several black-
box optimization techniques for both input-specic and universal
aacks and show that Bayesian optimization is an ecient method
for choosing parameters in such black-box aacks.
5.1 Bayesian Optimization
Bayesian optimization is a sequential optimization algorithm used
to nd optimal parameters for black-box objective functions [43, 68].
is technique is oen eective in solving various problems with
expensive cost functions such as hyperparameter tuning, reinforce-
ment learning, and combinatorial optimization [66]. Bayesian op-
timization consists of a probabilistic surrogate model, usually a
Gaussian Process (GP), and an acquisition function that guides its
queries. GP regression is used to update the belief on the parameters
with respect to the objective function aer each query [66].
Gaussian Processes. A GP is the generalization of Gaussian
distributions to a distribution over functions and is typically used
as the surrogate model for Bayesian optimization [57]. We use GPs
as they induce a posterior distribution over the objective function
that is analytically tractable. is allows us to update our beliefs
about the objective function aer each iteration [68].
A Gaussian Process GP(m,k) is fully described by a prior mean
function m : X → R and positive-denite kernel or covariance
function k : X × X → R. We describe GP regression to understand
how our GP is updated when more observations are available. e
following expressions give the GP prior and Gaussian likelihood
respectively
p(f | X) = N(m(X),K)
p(y | f ,X) = N(f (X),σ 2I)
where N denotes a normal distribution. Elements of the mean and
covariance matrix are given by mi = m(xi ) and Ki, j = k(xi ,xj ).
Given observations {X,y} and an arbitrary point x, the updated
posterior mean and covariance on the n-th query are given by
mn (x) =m(x) − (K + σ 2I)−1(y −m(X))
kn (x,x) = k(x,x) − k(x,X)(K + σ 2I)−1k(X,x).
We take the mean function to be zero m ≡ 0 to simplify evalu-
ation and since no prior knowledge can be incorporated into the
mean function [66] as is the case for black-box seings. A GP’s
ability to model a rich distribution of functions rests on its covari-
ance function which controls important properties of the function
distribution such as dierentiability, periodicity, and amplitude
[57, 66]. Any prior knowledge of the target function is encoded
in the hyperparameters of the covariance function. In a black box
seing, we adopt a more general covariance function in the Mate´rn
5/2 kernel
k5/2(x,x′) =
(
1 +
√
5r
l
+
5r2
3l2
)
exp
(
−
√
5r
l
)
where r = x−x′ and l is the length-scale parameter [68]. is results
in twice-dierentiable functions, an assumption that corresponds
to those made in popular black-box optimization algorithms like
quasi-Newton methods [68].
Acquisition Functions. e second component in Bayesian
optimization is an acquisition function that describes how optimal a
query is. Intuitively, the acquisition function evaluates the utility of
candidate points for the next evaluation [7]. e two most popular
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choices are the Expected Improvement (EI) and Upper Condence
Bound (UCB) [66]. First we dene µ(x) and σ 2(x) as the predictive
mean and variance of д(x) respectively. Let γ (x) = д(xbest)−µ(x)σ (x) .
e acquisition functions are
αEI(x) = σ (x)(γ (x)Φ(γ (x)) +N(γ (x) | 0, 1))
αUCB(x) = µ(x) + κσ (x), κ > 0
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. EI and
UCB have both been shown to be eective and data-ecient in
real black-box optimization problems [68]. However, most studies
have found that EI converges near-optimally and is beer-behaved
than UCB in the general case [7, 66, 68]. is makes EI the best
candidate for our acquisition function.
5.2 Universal Black-box Attack
For a universal black-box aack using procedural noise, the goal
is to nd the optimal parameters δ∗ for the procedural noise gen-
erating function G so that the universal evasion rate of perturba-
tion G(δ∗) generalizes to unknown inputs Xval. e aacker has
a smaller set of inputs Xtrain and optimizes their perturbation δ∗
for this dataset. e performance of the aack is measured by its
universal evasion rate over the validation set Xval. In a practical
seing, this is where the aacker optimizes their procedural noise
UAP over a small dataset, then injects that optimized perturbation
to other inputs–with the goal of causing as many misclassications
as possible.
Experiment. We use the Inception v3 model, `∞-norm ε = 16,
and the same 5,000 data points tested in Sect. 4 as Xval. Xtrain are
points from the ILSVRC2012 validation set not in Xval. We test for
training set sizes of 50, 125, 250, and 500, which corresponds to 1%,
2.5%, 5%, and 10% of the validation set size.
We compare Bayesian optimization with Limited-memory BFGS
(L-BFGS) [38], a quasi-Newton optimization algorithm that is oen
used in black-box optimization and machine learning. As the proce-
dural noise functions are non-dierentiable, we estimate gradients
using nite dierence approximation. is gradient approximation
is similar to what is used for other black-box aacks like zeroth-
order optimization [12], but here it is applied to a signicantly
smaller search space. When L-BFGS converges, possibly to a local
optima, we restart the optimization with a dierent random initial
point, stopping when the query limit is reached and choosing the
best optima value found.
We set a maximum query limit of 1,000 universal evasion eval-
uations on the training set Xtrain. In practice, this limit was not
necessary as both algorithms converged faster to their optimal
values: within the rst 100 queries for Bayesian optimization and
within the rst 250 queries for L-BFGS. ese are untargeted uni-
versal black-box aacks where the adversary has no knowledge of
the target model and only requires the top label from the model’s
outputs.
Results. e best procedural noise UAP computed from the
training sets generalized well to the much larger validation set, con-
sistently reaching 70% or more universal evasion on the validation
set for Perlin noise. is is a surprising result as the training sets
were 10-100 times smaller than the validation set. is may be due
to the inherent universality of our procedural noise perturbations.
We focus on Perlin noise as it outperforms Gabor noise, with the
laer averaging 58% universal evasion on the validation set.
Table 3 shows that Bayesian optimization (BayesOpt) reliably
outperforms L-BFGS in terms of universal evasion rate on the train-
ing sets and the resulting universal evasion rates on the validation
set. For comparison, random parameters for Perlin noise in Sect. 4
had a 98th percentile of 70.2% and a maximum of 73.1% universal
evasion. Bayesian optimization consistently reached or passed this
98th percentile while L-BFGS did not. It is reasonable for these
optimization algorithms not to beat the maximum since the train-
ing sets were signicantly smaller. Similar trends appear between
Bayesian optimization, random selection, and L-BFGS for Gabor
noise perturbations. We include these results in the Appendix D.
Table 3: Comparison on Inception v3 between universal Per-
lin noise black-box attacks. Universal evasion rates (%) of
the optimized perturbations are shown for their respective
training set and the validation set.
BayesOptper L-BFGSper
Train Size Train Val. Train Val.
50 78.0 71.4 74.0 69.9
125 77.6 70.2 76.0 71.5
250 71.6 71.2 71.2 69.7
500 75.0 72.9 73.4 70.8
5.3 Input-specic Black-box Attack
In this section, we use procedural noise for an input-specic black-
box algorithm. e goal of the adversary is to evade as many inputs
in the dataset, maximizing the input-specic evasion rate on inputs
that are not misclassied by the model. An important metric here
is the query-eciency of these aacks, as requiring large volumes
of queries per sample becomes impractical in real-world scenarios.
Metrics. We dene the success rate of an aack to be its input-
specic evasion excluding clean inputs that are already misclassied.
e average queries is measured over successful evasions.
Experiment. We use the Inception v3 model, `∞-norm ε = 16,
and the same 5,000 data points from Sect. 4. For a given input
x , the goal is to achieve evasion with arg max f (x + s) , τ (x) by
minimizing the probability of the true class label τ (x). In this case
we allow the aacker to access the model’s output probability vec-
tor, as the black-box optimization algorithms gain minimal usable
information if the output is binary (τ (x) or ¬τ (x)).
As in the previous section, we compare Bayesian optimization
and L-BFGS with a limit of 1,000 queries per input and number
of restarts when it converges. We use sparse GPs to beer scale
Bayesian optimization [42], as the standard GP scales cubically
with the number of observations. We also compare with uniform
random parameter selection from Sect. 4. ese are untargeted
input-specic black-box aacks where the adversary has no knowl-
edge of the target model and only requires the output probability
vector of the model.
Results. Table 4 shows that Bayesian optimization reached a
high 91.6% success rate with with just 7 queries per successful
evasion on average, under a restrictive 100 query limit. is vastly
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Table 4: Comparison on Inception v3 between our input-
specic Perlin noise black-box attacks and bandit attack
[25] for dierent query limits.
Aack ery Limit Average eries Success Rate (%)
BayesOptper 100 7.0 91.6
BayesOptper 1,000 8.4 92.8
L-BFGSper 100 19.8 71.7
L-BFGSper 1,000 70.1 86.5
Randomper 1,000 36.3a 91.6
BanditsTD 100 29.0 36.7
BanditsTD 1,000 224 73.6
BanditsTD 10,000 888 96.9
aFor each input, we divide the total number of perturbations by the number of those
that evade that input to get an expected number of queries.
improves on the query eciency over random parameters by 5-
fold whilst aaining the same accuracy. e improvement for
Bayesian optimization increasing the query limit from 100 to 1,000
was very incremental. is suggests that the limited codomain of
the procedural noise function is seing an upper bound on the
aack’s success rate.
L-BFGS performed the worst as we observe it can get trapped and
waste queries at poor local optima, which requires several restarts
from dierent initial points to improve its performance. ere were
similar trends for Gabor noise where Bayesian optimization had
78.3% success with 9.8 queries on average. For both procedural
noise functions, Bayesian optimization improved the average query
eciency over L-BFGS and random parameter selection by up to 7
times while retaining a success rate greater than 83%. We include
the other results in Appendix D.
Comparison. We compare our results with Ilyas et al. [25],
where they formalize their aack as a gradient estimation problem
(like in white-box gradient-based aacks), and use a bandit opti-
mization framework to solve it. We test the bandits aack on the
same model, dataset, and `∞-norm for maximum query limits of
100, 1,000, and 10,000.
e results show that the evasion rate of our input-specic proce-
dural noise aack greatly outperforms the bandits aack when the
query limit per image is a thousand or less. For signicantly larger
query limits, the Perlin noise Bayesian optimization aack has a
competitive success rate at a drastically beer query eciency–
needing 100 times less queries on average.
e procedural noise aack is optimized for universal evasion
and a restrictively small amount of queries. Most existing meth-
ods explore the entire image space which has a hundred thousand
dimensions, and some aacks reduce their search space with tech-
niques like tiling, but the dimensionality is still much larger than
the four parameters of our procedural noise. Other input-specic
black-box aacks [3, 6, 12] require tens to hundreds of thousands
of queries on realistic natural-image datasets, which makes them
inecient, but almost certain to nd an adversarial example given
enough queries. e bandits method makes a small sacrice in
success rate for more query eciency, and our procedural noise
aack takes it further for greater query-eciency.
Procedural noise perturbations have naturally high evasion rates,
although the expressiveness of our chosen functions can be less
than aacks whose larger codomains can capture more kinds of
adversarial perturbations. ese other aacks make this trade-
o by sacricing eciency in black-box scenarios, as the number
of queries they need to cra successful adversarial examples is
large. On the other hand, we can increase the expressiveness of our
procedural noise functions by introducing more parameters by, for
example, using dierent colour maps. However, this may come at
the cost of its naturally high universal evasion.
Summary. Black-box optimization techniques like Bayesian
optimization are able to take advantage of the drastically reduced
search space of procedural noise. Together with its naturally high
universal evasion, we show that procedural noise gives rise to
inexpensive yet potent untargeted black-box aacks, whether it
be input-specic or universal. It is also shown to be competitive
with existing aacks that oen require orders of magnitude more
queries or resources.
6 OTHER APPLICATIONS
In this section, we show how procedural noise aacks extend to
object detection DCNs by aacking YOLO v3 model. We then
discuss how exploiting the sensitivity of DCNs to low-level features,
like in procedural noise aacks, can be generalized to cra universal
aacks for DCNs in other application domains.
6.1 Attacking Object Detection
Object detection requires the identication of locations and classes
of objects within an image. “Single Shot Detectors” (SSD) such as
the dierent versions of YOLO [58, 59] generate their predictions
aer a single pass over the input image. is allows SSDs to process
images in real-time speeds while maintaining high accuracy. Other
types of object detectors such as Fast R-CNN [15] and Faster R-CNN
[61] are based on region proposals. ey have comparable accuracy
but do not achieve the same image processing speed as SSDs. We
test our aack against YOLO v3 [60], the latest iteration of YOLO,
which achieves high accuracy and detects objects in real time.
Metrics. We use precision, recall, and mean average precision
(mAP) as our primary metrics; mAP is frequently used when com-
paring the overall performance of object detectors. In object detec-
tion the classier predicts a bounding box to identify the location
of an object and assigns that box a class label. e Intersection Over
Union (IOU) is the ratio of the intersection area over the union
area between the predicted and ground truth bounding boxes. A
threshold is usually set to determine what IOU constitutes a posi-
tive classication. True positives occur when the IOU is larger than
the threshold and the class is identied correctly. False negatives
occur when the threshold is not met with the correct class for a
ground truth bounding box. False positives occur when the IOU
is less than the threshold, there are no intersecting ground truth
boxes, or there are duplicate predicted bounding boxes.
Experiment. We use the MS COCO dataset [36] which contains
80 dierent classes, with a large proportion of targets being the
“person” class. is has become one of the benchmark datasets for
object detection. We use standard seings as described in [60], with
input dimensions 416 × 416 × 3 and an IOU threshold of 0.5.
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We use `∞-norm ε = 16 and apply each of our procedural noise
perturbations on the 1,000 random images from the validation set.
e perturbations generated are from 1,000 Gabor noise, 1,000 Perlin
noise, and 1,000 `∞-optimized uniform random perturbations. e
parameters are chosen uniformly at random so that we can analyze
the results, as in Sect. 4. is is a universal untargeted black-box
aack.
Figure 3: Histogram of metrics over all perturbations on
YOLO v3. Results for (top) all classes and (bottom) the “per-
son” class.
Results. e procedural noise perturbations signicantly de-
crease the mAP of the model, with 75% of Perlin noise perturbations
halving the mAP or worse. e precision and recall also decreased in
the presence of our perturbations. Again, Perlin noise outperforms
Gabor noise on average but Gabor noise has a smaller minimum,
with at least one perturbation causing 0.09 mAP. Compared to uni-
form random noise, which maintained around 0.34 mAP, both Perlin
and Gabor noise had larger impact on the model’s performance.
We represent uniform random noise using the median (which, in
this case, is very close to the mean) on each metric as the variance
is very small (less than 10−5).
In Fig. 3, for the metrics across all classes, we can observe that the
precision was maintained or decreased while the recall and mAP
decreased. Some perturbations decreased all three metrics, which
indicate that these cause both false positives and false negatives
consistently. When the perturbation increases the precision while
decreasing the recall and mAP, then the noise is likely masking
objects rather than introducing new objects to the image. is
masking eect has serious implications for security applications
like surveillance and autonomous vehicles.
We focus on the “person” class as it constitutes a majority of
the targets and is semantically meaningful in the context of some
applications. In Fig. 3, metrics for “person” follow a similar trend
to the metrics across all classes. However, the increase in precision
is very small (¡0.10) compared to the large drops in recall and mAP
caused by Perlin noise. e higher precision indicates fewer false
positives, while the decrease in recall indicates more false negatives.
is indicates that the classier is making fewer predictions overall,
which means that the noise is masking persons in the image.
Whilst for the most relevant “person” class, our procedural noise
appears to have an obfuscating eect, for other classes like “zebra”
all the metrics decrease – indicating that there are many false
positive and false negatives. However, for three classes, “backpack”,
“book”, and “toaster”, all three metrics improve. ese labels did not
have as much representation in the test set which may explain this
anomalous result.
e frequency of the sine ϕsine for Perlin noise had the largest
inverse correlation of less than -0.72 with each of the three metrics.
is means that high-frequency paerns decrease the model’s per-
formance metrics, similarly to what we have observed for the image
classiers. e thickness λ of Gabor noise is moderately correlated
at 0.4 with the precision, but not the recall or mAP. is suggests
that thicker Gabor noise perturbations decrease the number of false
positives relative to the other perturbations.
Discussion. Object detection is a more complex task than image
classication as it has to identify multiple objects and their locations
within an image. Although YOLO v3 has a dierent architecture,
task, and dataset from the ImageNet classiers, we see that the same
procedural noise perturbations are still able to greatly degrade its
performance. is shows that it is more likely caused by the models’
sensitivity towards perturbations rather than a texture bias, as the
object detection task has a spatial component to it. is suggests
that our procedural noise aacks may generalize to other DCNs on
computer vision tasks with natural-image data.
In our discussion in Sect. 4.4, we hypothesized that the proce-
dural noise perturbations are an aggregation of low-level features at
high frequencies that the DCNs strongly respond to. e prior that
convolutional layers induce and similarities across natural-image
datasets may be why DCNs are sensitive to these noise paerns.
Additionally, like in Sect. 5, we can also create more ecient black-
box aacks by applying black-box optimization techniques such as
Bayesian optimization to enhance the aack against object detec-
tors. When using Bayesian optimization, an aacker can focus on
minimizing a specic metric (precision, recall, mAP, or F1 score).
6.2 Beyond Images
One of the main strengths of procedural noise is that it allows to
describe a distribution of UAPs with only a few parameters. is
compressed representation allows for an ecient generation of
UAPs both for undermining a machine learning service or, defen-
sively, for testing the robustness of a model. In practice, compressed
representations can be learned by generative models such as GANs
[46, 77] or Variational Autoencoders (VAEs), however these incur
additional training, calibration, and maintenance costs. Training
algorithms or defences that incorporate domain-specic knowledge
may be needed to mitigate the sensitivity towards aacks that make
use of these compact representations.
DCNs in other applications may also be vulnerable to aggrega-
tions of low-level features due to the use of convolutional layers.
Future aacks can exploit how DCNs rely on combining low-level
features rather than understanding the more dicult global fea-
tures in the input data. A natural next step would be to apply
these ideas in exploratory aacks or sensitivity analysis on sensory
applications like speech recognition and natural language process-
ing. To expand our procedural noise aack framework to other
applications, it is worth identifying paerns in existing adversarial
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examples for domains like speech recognition [9, 11] and reinforce-
ment learning [24, 37] to nd analogues of procedural noise. As a
starting point, these paerns can be found by nding perturbations
that maximize the hidden layer dierence as in the Singular Vector
Aack [30] or by using feature visualization on earlier layers of
DCNs to infer the low-level features that a model learns.
7 PRELIMINARY DEFENCE
e DCNs we tested are surprisingly fragile to procedural noise as
UAPs. Improving their robustness to adversarial examples is not a
straightforward task. A robust defence needs to defend not only
against existing aacks but also future aacks, and oen proposed
defences are shown to fail against new or existing aacks [8].
Among existing defences, adversarial training appears to be
more robust than others [1]. However, we have shown in Table 2
that ensemble adversarial training against gradient-based aacks
did not signicantly diminish the input-specic evasion rate of
our procedural noise aack. is suggests that such defences do
not generalize well as the aacks used for adversarial training do
not suciently represent the entire space of adversarial examples.
Training against all types of adversarial aacks would become com-
putationally expensive, especially for high-dimensional tasks like
ImageNet. us, defences that regularize the model or incorporate
domain-specic knowledge may be more ecient strategies.
DCNs’ weakness to adversarial perturbations across inputs may
be a result of their sensitivity—small changes to the input cause
large changes to the output. us, input-agnostic defences that
minimize the impact of small perturbations may be eective in
reducing the models’ sensitivity without the need to train against
all types of aacks. As a preliminary investigation, we briey
explore here using denoising to defend against the universality of
our procedural noise perturbations.
Figure 4: Histogram of metrics over all perturbations on In-
ception v3 with and without median denoising for (le) Ga-
bor noise and (right) Perlin noise for `∞-norm ε = 16.
7.1 Denoising
Denoising with spatial lters is a common pre-processing step
in signal processing and is thus an aractive defence due to its
simplicity and pervasiveness across signal processing applications.
Median ltering is a smoothing operation that replaces each entry
with the median of its neighbouring entries, and it oen preserves
edges while removing noise. e idea is to smooth out the high-
frequency noise, which we know to be highly correlated with the
universal evasion rates for Perlin noise on Inception v3.
Experiment. We retrain Inception v3 with a median denoising
lter applied as a pre-processing step. For this evaluation, we use
the same 1,000 of each procedural noise, 1,000 uniform random
perturbations, and 5,000 validation set points as in Sect. 4. We
test how denoising improves robustness for `∞ aack norms ε =
4, 8, 12, and 16. e decrease in the number of uniform random
perturbations is due to results in Sect. 4, where we found that its
universal evasion rate had very low variance across 10,000 samples,
and our results show it is similar for 1,000 samples.
Results. e min-max oscillations present in the procedural
noise perturbations may have allowed the noise paerns to per-
sist despite the denoising, as the universal evasion rates are not
completely mitigated by the defence. Across the dierent `∞-norm
values, the denoising decreased the median and mean universal eva-
sion rates by a consistent amount when compared with no defence:
7.2-10.8% for Gabor noise and 13.2-16.9% for Perlin noise. Fig. 4
shows that the decrease in eectiveness of Perlin noise is much
greater than that for Gabor noise, suggesting that the denoising
appears to slightly mitigate the eectiveness of high-frequency
noise paerns.
is denoising defence grants a reasonable increase in robustness
despite the simplicity of the algorithm. However, this measure has
not fully mitigated the sensitivity to procedural noise. We hope
future work explore more input-agnostic defences that minimize
the sensitivity of large-scale models to small perturbations with
techniques like model compression [20], Jacobian regularization
[27, 30, 62, 69], or other types of denoising.
8 CONCLUSION
We highlight the strengths of procedural noise as an indiscrimi-
nate and inexpensive black-box aack on DCNs. We have shown
that popular DCN architectures for image classication have sys-
temic vulnerabilities to procedural noise perturbations, with Perlin
noise UAPs that achieve 58% or larger universal evasion across non-
adversarially trained models. is weakness to procedural noise
can be used to cra ecient universal and input-specic black-box
aacks. Our procedural noise aack augmented with Bayesian
optimization aains competitive input-specic success rates whilst
improving the query eciency of existing black-box methods over
100 times. Moreover, we show that procedural noise aacks also
work against the YOLO v3 model for object detection, where it has
an obfuscating eect on the “person” class.
Our results have notable implications. e universality of our
black-box method introduces the possibility for large-scale aacks
on DCN-based machine learning services, and the use of Bayesian
optimization makes untargeted black-box aacks signicantly more
ecient. We hypothesize that our procedural noise aacks exploit
low-level features that DCNs are sensitive towards. If true, this has
worrying implications on the safety of transfer learning, as it is
oen these low-level features that are preserved when retraining
models for new tasks. It may be the case that universal aacks
can be extended to other application domains by using compact
representations of UAPs that exploit the sensitivity of models to
low-level features.
We have shown the diculty of defending against such novel
approaches. In particular, ensemble adversarial training on gradient-
based methods was unable to signicantly diminish our procedural
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noise aack. We suggest that future defences take more input-
agnostic approaches to avoid the costs in defending and retraining
against all possible aacks. Our work prompts the need for further
research of more intuitive and novel aack frameworks that use
analogues of procedural noise in other machine learning applica-
tion domains such as audio processing and reinforcement learning.
We hope future work will explore in more depth the nature of cross-
model universal adversarial perturbations, as these vulnerabilities
generalize across both inputs and models, and a more formal frame-
work could beer explain why our procedural noise aacks are
eective.
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A EXAMPLES OF PERTURBATIONS
Figs. 5 and 6 show examples of perturbations from procedural noise
functions and existing white-box UAP aacks. Notice the visual
similarities in structure between the noise paerns in Figs. 5 and 6.
Figure 5: Procedural noise patterns with (top) Gabor noise
and (bottom) Perlin noise, both with decreasing frequency
from le to right.
Figure 6: UAPs generated for VGG-19 using the white-box
Singular Vector Attack [30].
B TOP 5 INPUT-SPECIFIC EVASION
In Table 5, we consider the top 5 input-specic evasion rate where
the true class label is outside the top 5 class labels in the perturbed
image x +s . e top 5 error is oen used alongside the top 1 error to
measure the performance of classiers on ImageNet. Top 5 evasion
is more dicult than top 1 as the condence in the true label has to
be degraded suciently enough for it to be below ve other class
labels. Despite that, Perlin noise is able to achieve top 5 evasion
on more than half the inputs for all tested models. We see that our
procedural noise still remains a strong aack for the top 5 error
metric.
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Table 5: Top 5 input-specic evasion rate (in %) for random
and procedural noise perturbations. Original refers to the
top 5 error on the unaltered original images. e strongest
attack on each classier is highlighted.
Classier Original Random Gabor Perlin
VGG-19 9.5 28.0 90.2 92.6
ResNet-50 8.4 29.5 82.5 85.3
Inception v3 6.3 18.0 66.9 79.5
IRv2 4.5 13.2 56.3 66.4
IRv2ens 5.1 12.1 44.1 53.6
C CORRELATION MATRICES
Procedural noise perturbations had their parameters chosen uni-
formly at random and with constraint `∞-norm ε = 16. For Sect. 4,
Figs. 7 and 8 show the correlation matrices between the proce-
dural noise parameters and the corresponding universal evasion
rates on the various ImageNet classiers. ese correlations quan-
tify the eects of each parameter and the transferability of UAPs
across models. e labels “V19”, “R50”, and “INv3” refer to VGG-19,
ResNet-50, and Inception v3 respectively.
Figure 7: Correlations between Gabor noise parameters
(δgab = {σ ,ω, λ, ξ }) and universal evasion rates on each im-
age classier.
Figure 8: Correlations between Perlin noise parameters
(δper = {λx , λy ,ϕsine,ω}) and universal evasion rates on each
image classier.
D BLACK-BOX ATTACK RESULTS
For Sect. 5, full results for input-specic and universal black-box
aacks against Inception v3 are in Tables 6 and 7. We include results
for Gabor noise (gab) and Perlin noise (per). e bandit aacks [25]
include the use of time (T) and time with data (TD) priors. Methods
are separated according to the base aack that was used: Gabor
noise, Perlin noise, and bandits framework.
Table 6: Results for input-specic black-box attacks on In-
ception v3 with `∞-norm ε = 16. Gabor and Perlin noise
attacks are labeled with “gab” and “per” respectively. Best
success rate per method is highlighted.
Aack ery Limit Average eries Success Rate (%)
BayesOptgab 100 9.8 83.1
BayesOptgab 1,000 10.9 83.6
L-BFGSgab 100 6.0 44.7
L-BFGSgab 1,000 6.0 44.7
Randomgab 1,000 62.2 86.1
BayesOptper 100 7.0 91.6
BayesOptper 1,000 8.4 92.8
L-BFGSper 100 19.8 71.7
L-BFGSper 1,000 70.1 86.5
Randomper 1,000 36.3 91.6
BanditsT 100 31.3 14.3
BanditsT 1,000 330 47.6
BanditsT 10,000 1,795 88.3
BanditsTD 100 29.0 36.7
BanditsTD 1,000 224 73.6
BanditsTD 10,000 888 96.9
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Table 7: Results for universal black-box attacks on Inception v3 with `∞-norm ε = 16. Gabor and Perlin noise attacks are
labeled with “gab” and “per” respectively. Universal evasion rates (%) of the optimized perturbations are shown for their
respective training set and the validation set.
BayesOptgab L-BFGSgab BayesOptper L-BFGSper
Train Size Train Val. Train Val. Train Val. Train Val.
50 64.0 57.6 58.0 51.6 78.0 71.4 74.0 69.9
125 64.6 58.0 58.4 54.6 77.6 70.2 76.0 71.5
250 60.0 58.4 58.8 56.0 71.6 71.2 71.2 69.7
500 64.8 62.4 59.8 58.0 75.0 72.9 73.4 70.8
E ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Figs. 9 and 10 contain some samples of adversarial examples from
our procedural noise aacks against image classication and object
detection tasks.
Figure 9: Gabor noise adversarial examples on (top) Incep-
tion v3, (middle) VGG-19, and (bottom) ResNet-50. Figure 10: Perlin noise adversarial examples on YOLO v3.
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